The Report’s Core Finding: RPGs Are Adapting to Modern Battlefields
The report’s central warning is that the rocket-propelled grenade is no longer simply a cheap, short-range weapon used by lightly armed insurgents. While the basic concept remains unchanged—a shaped-charge warhead propelled by a small rocket motor—modern variants and improvised versions have become more accurate, more powerful, and easier to employ in coordinated attacks. The report notes that tandem-charge warheads, designed to defeat explosive reactive armor, are appearing more often in conflict zones. Thermobaric and fragmentation variants are also being used against personnel, vehicles, and fortified positions, giving small units a disproportionate ability to inflict damage.
According to the assessment, the proliferation of RPGs is driven by several factors: loose export controls, battlefield capture, black-market sales, and local manufacturing. In some areas, workshops are producing launchers and warheads with commercially available tools, making supply chains harder to track and interdict. The report also highlights the growing use of commercial drones for reconnaissance, which allows RPG teams to spot targets, choose ambush positions, and confirm hits before withdrawing. This combination of low-cost firepower and improvised intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is changing the tactical calculus for armored columns, forward operating bases, and low-flying aircraft.
The report warns that many military units still underestimate the RPG because it is old, simple, and widely understood. That familiarity has bred complacency. In reality, the weapon’s simplicity is a strength: it can be used by poorly trained fighters, concealed easily, and fired from rooftops, doorways, trenches, or moving vehicles. The report calls for renewed attention to incident tracking, technical exploitation of captured systems, and rapid sharing of threat data across allied forces. Without such steps, it argues, units will continue to be surprised by an adversary that has learned to use a legacy weapon in very modern ways.
Why RPG Attacks Are Rising in Irregular and Urban Conflicts
The report links the rise in RPG attacks to the character of contemporary conflict. Many recent and ongoing wars are fought in cities, towns, and densely populated areas where armored vehicles and infantry are forced into close quarters. In these environments, line-of-sight is short, cover is abundant, and attackers can disappear into civilian infrastructure. An RPG team can wait in a damaged building, fire at a convoy from a few dozen meters away, and escape through alleys or tunnels before counterfire arrives. This shoot-and-scoot tactic is difficult to defeat with traditional perimeter security or aerial surveillance alone.
Irregular forces also favor RPGs because they offer a way to challenge technically superior opponents without matching their budgets. A single successful ambush can destroy or disable an armored vehicle, kill or wound crew members, and force a convoy to halt, reroute, or request costly medical evacuation. The psychological effect is often as important as the physical damage. Repeated RPG attacks can slow operations, stretch security forces, and create the impression that no route or base is truly safe. In some theaters, RPGs are used alongside improvised explosive devices, small arms, and mortar fire to create complex ambushes that overwhelm a unit’s ability to respond.
The report also points to proliferation networks. Weapons diverted from state stockpiles, captured from defeated units, or produced in illicit workshops move across borders through smuggling routes and local arms markets. Social media and encrypted messaging can spread instructions, targeting footage, and propaganda, encouraging copycat attacks. At the same time, urban growth in fragile regions gives attackers more places to hide and more critical infrastructure to threaten. The result is a threat environment in which RPGs are not fading away but are being integrated into broader irregular warfare strategies. The report urges commanders to treat the RPG as a persistent, adaptive, and strategically significant weapon rather than a tactical nuisance.
Hardening Vehicles and Bases Against a Persistent Close-Range Threat
The report devotes considerable attention to defensive measures. For vehicles, the first layer is armor. Slat armor, also known as bar or cage armor, can prevent a shaped-charge warhead from functioning properly by crushing or shorting its fuze. Spaced armor, composite materials, and spall liners can reduce the effects of a penetration if one occurs. However, the report cautions that armor alone is not a solution. Added armor increases weight, reduces mobility, strains engines and suspensions, and complicates air transport. It can also create a false sense of security if crews do not adapt their tactics to the remaining vulnerabilities.
Active protection systems are increasingly seen as a critical layer. These systems use radar, optical sensors, or other detectors to identify an incoming rocket and then launch interceptors, deploy smoke, or trigger other countermeasures. Some soft-kill systems aim to disrupt the attacker’s aim or obscure the vehicle, while hard-kill systems attempt to destroy the projectile in flight. The report notes that active protection can be effective, but it is not foolproof against salvos, close-range ambushes, or improvised launchers. Cost, maintenance, and integration with existing vehicles remain obstacles, especially for smaller forces and partner militaries.
For fixed bases, the report recommends layered defenses that combine physical barriers, overhead cover, sensors, and rapid response. Berms, walls, wire mesh, and vegetation clearing can limit firing positions and reduce concealment. Sentry towers, thermal cameras, acoustic sensors, and drone patrols can provide early warning. Quick reaction forces, medical teams, and counter-battery or counter-mortar systems must be ready to respond within seconds. The report also stresses the importance of route planning, convoy spacing, overwatch positions, and the use of decoys. The goal is not to make any single vehicle or base invulnerable, but to make RPG attacks less likely to succeed and less costly when they do occur.
Training, Intelligence, and the Future of Counter-RPG Defense
The report argues that training and intelligence are as important as hardware. Units need realistic instruction in recognizing ambush indicators, reacting to contact, and continuing the mission under fire. Simulators and live-fire exercises can help crews practice rapid reversing, evasive maneuvers, and dismounted counter-ambush drills. Medical personnel must be prepared for blast and fragmentation injuries. Leaders must learn to assess routes, identify choke points, and adjust plans when intelligence warns of increased RPG activity. The report notes that many casualties occur in the first seconds of an ambush, so instinctive, well-rehearsed responses save lives.
On the intelligence side, the report calls for better collection and analysis of RPG incidents. Pattern analysis can reveal ambush hotspots, preferred firing positions, and supply routes. Technical exploitation of captured launchers and warheads can identify manufacturers, modifications, and origins. Geospatial and signals intelligence can help map workshops, smuggling networks, and training camps. Sharing this information with allies and partner forces can disrupt proliferation and expose the financiers and facilitators behind the trade. The report also recommends tightening export controls, marking weapons where possible, and interdicting black-market transfers.
Looking ahead, the report urges investment in new defensive technologies: improved active protection, lighter armor materials, counter-drone systems, and automated threat detection. It also recommends doctrinal updates that emphasize dispersion, camouflage, deception, and combined arms. Helicopter and low-flying aircraft crews need warning systems and tactics to avoid known RPG corridors. Above all, the report warns against treating the RPG as a problem of the past. As long as the weapon remains cheap, portable, and lethal, it will attract users. The rising threat described in the report is not inevitable, but countering it will require sustained attention, funding, and cooperation across units, services, and nations.
